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© Mitchell Bard 2016

Why Sanctions Help (Not Harm) Iran

After giving Iran another full year to move closer to building a nuclear weapon, the Obama Administration is finally coming to the realization that its engagement strategy was a failure. Its fallback position has been to threaten new sanctions, but this approach will not succeed and may, in fact, help the Iranian regime and ensure it becomes a nuclear power.

Perhaps the most significant problem with the idea of sanctions is that it gives the impression of action without really achieving anything. Sanctions are already in place and have not stopped Iran’s progress. Proponents say that they simply need to be stronger, but a tougher sanctions regime has a number of problems. First, it will take yet more time to adopt any new measures and, with each passing day, Iran’s program advances. Many experts already believe Iran can now build a bomb and the point of no return has passed.

The chance of imposing draconian sanctions also remains remote. China and Russia continue to oppose them. Moreover, the current sanctions have demonstrated their ineffectiveness because of the widespread cheating by not only those two nations but many others as well.

Advocates of sanctions have also consistently underestimated the will of the Iranians. The mullahs have been unfazed by the current restrictions and there is no reason to believe they will be cowed by additional measures. The Obama Administration also is so afraid of hurting average Iranians it favors sanctions that only impact the regime, but the leaders will take care of themselves at the expense of the people. Besides, if the people do not feel any pain, why should they be motivated to change their government’s policy?

This raises yet another problem with sanctions. Rather than turn the people against the government, they could unite them instead. Opponents of military action frequently suggest that all Iranians would come together to defend their country if it came under attack, but why is this true only in the case of a shooting war and not an economic one?

Some analysts argue recent protests against the government signal that regime change is near. This is wishful thinking. There is no evidence the regime will fall or that the opposition would adopt a different nuclear policy. Iranians see obtaining a nuclear weapon as a matter of national pride, as something they are as entitled to as any other country, and as a means to return their nation to greatness. Why would even the most airtight, draconian sanctions change their attitude?

It is time to end the fiction that either negotiations or sanctions will move the Iranians to abandon their nuclear ambitions. Two unpleasant options remain – either take military action or develop a strategy to cope with a nuclear Iran. War will have serious consequences and may only provide a short-term solution. Living with a nuclear Iran may be even worse, because it will allow Iran to become a regional hegemon, and will trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that will exponentially increase the threats of nuclear terror and war.

The president faces a difficult decision. Recent polls show the American people would support military action against Iran. That support will hold only if the operation is a success. Leaders in Germany, France and Britain might support military action since they have led the fight against Iran, but the publics in those countries will rebel. The rest of the world, which held out hope Obama was a different kind of president, one who would not use America’s might to defend liberty, will be appalled. Obama will also alienate his party base, which is already furious that he has not withdrawn from Iraq and escalated the war in Afghanistan.

The U.S. position, meanwhile, has made Israel’s already difficult position even worse. Israel was told not to attack Iran and watched the world let their enemy develop the bomb. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has to decide whether he can trust Obama to act, adopt a policy of deterrence against Iran, with the likelihood it will later face multiple Arab nuclear powers, or strike knowing the operation may not succeed and could have catastrophic military, economic and political consequences.

Unhappy New Year.